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RESPONSIBILITY IN THE JUVENILE COURT
Common la'w defenses of infancy and insanity are reviewed as
they relate to children charged 'with crime. The decline of these
defenses in the nineteenth century is traced, and a proposal is ad-
vanced that a broadened form of these defenses now be recognized
in order that grossly immature and severely ill children not be
branded as delinquents.
SANFORD J. Fox*
In the current climate of reexamining the roots and role of the
juvenile court,1 it is natural that fundamental questions of substantive
law should reflect the same turbulence. Clearly this is so -in regard to
the matters of mental capacity and the legal responsibility of children
charged with some form of deviance. In large part, these are questions
concerning the appropriateness of the common law responsibility de-
fenses of insanity2 and infancy3 to a charge of delinquency based on
criminal conduct.4 Responsibility also raises the enigmatic freewill
question of whether mens rea is an element that must be proved in
the juvenile court where crime is alleged. 5
THE Co MoN LAw BACKGROUND
Insanity and infancy constituted the only substantive law defenses
exculpating juvenile criminals on grounds of irresponsibility. How
intimately related these two have been is well illustrated by a 1641
colonial statute which anticipated that principles of religion and rea-
son would support both defenses:
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of Illinois, 1950;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1953.
1. Traditional juvenile court history, represented by H. Lou, JuvEaNH CouRTs IrN
im UN=r.o STATES (1927), is being subjected to detailed revision. See, e.g., R. PicK.arr,
HOUSE oF REFUGE (1969); A. PLATrT, Tim CnmL SAVERS (1969). The most significant
redefinition of the juvenile court's role is, of course, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Fox, Perspectives on juvenile justice Reform, 22 STAN. L. REv. - (June 1970).
2. See, e.g., Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209, 36 Am. Rep. 132 (1880).
3. See, e.g., Walker's Case, 5 N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 137 (1820).
4. This is a ground for adjudicating delinquency in all states.
5. See Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. F~Ar. L. 121 (1965).
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Children, Idiots, Distracted Persons, and all that are strangers or
new comers to our plantation, shall have such allowances as
religion and reason require. 6
Insanity and infancy continued to share common ground. Early in
the evolution of American law, the infancy defense came to repeat
Blackstone's eighteenth century description.7 Children under the age
of seven could be guilty of no offense. When they reached the age
of fourteen, they were treated as adults, with no special rules of ir-
responsibility operating in their favor. Between these two ages, a child
could be found guilty only if the state could establish that he could
discern "between good and evil";8 if a reasonable doubt were raised
concerning his ability to perceive the difference, he could not be
punished." Sometimes he must have known the "nature and illegality"
of his act.1 These rules applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies.1
On the question of irresponsibility by reason of insanity, the first
cases in American criminal jurisprudence seem again to have paralleled
English law. Prior to the momentous decision in M'Naughten's Case'
in 1843, courts on both sides of the Atlantic often dealt with the mat-
ter of insanity as a largely undefined concept; no one test or standard
prevailed by which the availability of the defense could be determined. 8
Thus, in New York, counsel attempted to establish, by "ocular demon-
stration," the defense that his client was an "idiot" suffering from
"downright madness." 14 In 1827 a Massachusetts judge spoke merely
of the "mental derangement" of a thirteen-year-old accused.15 As
early as 1816 the overlap of the insanity and the infancy defenses was
indicated by a jury charge in New York.
6. THE BODY OF LimERTias OF 1641, No. 52 in THE CoLONiAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETS
of 1660 to 1672 at 45 (W. Whitmore, ed. 1889).
7. 4 W. BLAcKsroNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23 (T. Cooley, ed.
1879).
8. Ford v. State, 100 Ga. 63, 25 S.E. 845 (1896).
9. Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323, 327, 70 Am. Dec. 494, 495 (1858).
10. Benbow v. State, 128 Ala. 1, 29 So. 553 (1901); Price v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 71,
95 S.W. 901 (1906).
11. State v. Goin, 9 Humph. 175, 176-77 (Tenn. 1848).
12. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
13. See S. GLuECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THR CRIMINAL LAW 123-60 (1927). Platt &
Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and
Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALiF.
L. REv. 1227, 1235-36 (1966), argues that right-wrong test was in almost uninterrupted
use in England since the sixteenth century.
14. Cook's Case, 1 N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 5 (1816).
15. Commonwealth v. French, Thacher's Criminal Cases 163, 165 (Mass. 1827).
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After the arguments of the counsel, his Honour the mayor
charged the jury, that such was the humanity of the law, that
no man could be held responsible for an act committed while
deprived of reason; and that a madman was generally considered,
in law, incapable of committing a crime. But it is not every
degree of madness or insanity, which abridges the responsibility
attached to the commission of crime. In that species of madness,
where the prisoner has lucid intervals; if during those intervals
and when capable of distinguishing good from evil, he perpe-
trates an offence, he is responsible. The principal subject of in-
quiry, therefore, in this case is, whether the prisoner at the
time he committed this offence, had sufficient capacity to dis-
cern good from evil.16
This is essentially the M'Naughten right-wrong test, adopted in
American law one year after it was decided in the House of Lords.'7
Children and insane persons were now to have such allowances as the
concept of right and wrong require.' 8
RESPONSIBILITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY JUVENILE JUSTICE
The 1800's was a period of incalculable importance for children
because of the creation of the first juvenile reformatory in 1824,'9
and the first juvenile court in 1899.20 Between these events there de-
veloped a legal system of predelinquency whereby juvenile deviance-
crime, poverty, begging, idleness, wandering about the streets-was
16. Clark's Case, 1 N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 177 (1816).
17. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. 500, 501-03 (1844). Platt & Diamond, supra
note 13, at 1257, suggest that the right-wrong test was part of American jurisprudence
much earlier in the nineteenth century.
18. The Platt & Diamond thesis that the right-wrong test is of more ancient origin
than 1843 and 1844 in England and America, respectively, means that the overlap be-
tween insanity and infancy is correspondingly more ancient. They conclude from early
materials that:
By the time of Elizabeth I (c. 1581), there existed a legal rationale for the
exclusion of special groups from criminal responsibility. Infants and the
insane both generally failed to possess the necessary mental capacity to
commit a crime; they were treated as "nonpersons" because of their sup-
posed lack of understanding, intelligence, and moral discretion. Moreover,
they were not considered fit subjects for punishment since they did not
comprehend the moral implication of their harmful act.
Platt & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1234.
19. The New York House of Refuge was opened in 1825 under an 1824 charter
received by the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in the city of New
York. Ch. 126, [1824] N.Y. Sess. Laws 110-12. See Pickett, supra note 1.
20. [1899] Ill. Sess. Laws 131-37.
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seen as prodromal to adult crime. Therefore, official intervention was
thought necessary to inculcate the skills and values that might ac-
complish crime prevention.21 The concept of legal irresponsibility suf-
fered under this system which emphasized the treatment of symptoms
rather than the punishment for wrong. The effort to deal with root
problems was viewed as quite different from punishing the child for
whatever he might have done because of his problems. The prosecution
of a child in the nineteenth century was undertaken because, as lawyer
Ingersoll observed in 1835, "he manifests his unfitness for self-govern-
ment and absence or abuse of domestic authority and influence ....
Instead of being subject to, they are saved from punishment." 2. It was
consistent for the reformers to note again and again that children got
into trouble through no fault of their own, 23 and for the courts to see
this child-saving enterprise as unrelated to the defense of infancy in
run-of-the-mill cases.24 If a child did not know that what he did was
wrong, so much more did he need to be reformed. There is evidence
21. See generally supra note 1.
22. FIFSEENrH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGERS OF THE SOCIErY FOR THE REFORMA-
TION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE CITY OF NEW Yoiu 46 (1840).
23. E.g., REPORT OF A COMMITrEE APPOINTED BY THE SociETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF
PAUPERISM IN THE SAID CITY ON THE SUBJECT OF ERECTING A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR
VAGRANT AND DEPRAVED YOUNG PEOPLE (1823) in DocuMENTs RF.LATIVE TO THE HOUSE
OF REFUGE 13 (Hart. ed. 1832):
The parents of these children, are, in all probability, too poor, or too de-
generate, to provide them with clothing fit for them to be seen in at school;
and know not where to place them in order that they may find employ-
ment, or be better cared for. Accustomed, in many instances, to witness at
home nothing in the way of example, but what is degrading; early taught
to observe intemperance, and to hear obscene and profane language without
disgust; obliged to beg, and even encouraged to acts of dishonesty, to satisfy
the wants induced by the indolence of their parents, - what can be expected,
but that such children will, in due time, become responsible to the laws for
crimes, which have thus, in a manner been forced upon them?
See also FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGERS OF THE SOcIETY FOR THE REFORMA-
TION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1829) in DOCUMENTS RELA-
TIVE TO THE HOUSE OF REFUGE 149 (Hart ed. 1832).
24. Although there are reported cases in which the infancy defense was invoked,
see, e.g., Walker's Case, 5 N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 137 (1820), they arose before the
entry of the predelinquency concept in American jurisprudence, signaled by the House
of Refuge movement in the early 1820's. From that point on, there are no reported
decisions in the nineteenth century which discuss the infancy defense except those
in which there is an unambiguous criminal prosecution against the child, undiluted by
any ideas that something other than the familiar relation of crime and punishment is
at stake. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 8 and 9, supra. These were, on the whole, rela-
tively serious offenses, not the vagrancy, begging, and petty theft sorts of deviance on
which the pre-delinquency concept operated.
(Vol. 11: 659
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to suggest that while judicial inquiries paid little heed to such technical
legal matters as infancy, they exclusively focused, in conformity with
the predelinquency theory, on such questions as whether the child
was a fit subject for "cure" by one of the nineteenth century's juve-
nile institutions.25
Legislation, as well as legal administration, eroded the relevance and
impact of the common law defenses, particularly infancy. In Illinois,
for example, children first benefited from legislation that raised their
absolute immunity to criminal prosecution from seven to ten.26 But
influenced by the predelinquency concept, subsequent legislation made
children over the ages of six or eight eligible for incarceration in the
reform schools.27 The Industrial School acts went still further; they
accepted any child under a certain age, entirely eliminating the no-
tion of any lower age limit.28 If "treatment" of children to prevent later
development of criminal character was good, the earlier the process
was started the better. Since, in the outlook of these schemes, children
were not being punished, it was irrelevant to treat their possible ir-
responsibility. As Glanville Williams has recently observed, it is "the
retributive theory of punishment [which] imports the doctrine of moral
responsibility into the law." 29 When, however, children were tried
according to regular criminal procedures, where the presence of a
retributive theory was more discernible instead of being subjected to
25. Illinois legislation in 1863, for example, directed judges to commit boys convicted
of crimes to the Chicago Reform School
who, in the opinion of the court, would be a fit and proper subject ....
Provided, however, that such boys only shall be committed to said reform
school as in the opinion of the court are in need of and will be benefited
by the reformatory influence of said school, the school being intended as an
educational and reformatory institution, rather than as a prison or place of
punishment.
Ch. 14, § 9, [1863] Ill. Pvt. Laws 132-38 in NINTH ANNUAL Ruoar OF THE OFFICERS OF
THE CHIcAGO REFORM SCHOOL TO THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 41, 44-45
(1865). For a description of how this worked while the Chicago Reform School re-
mained in business see the statement of its last Superintendent in FnFri ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE OFFICERS Or THE CHICAGO REFORM SCHOOL TO THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS
24-25 (1871).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. § 4 (1845).
27. Ch. 14, § 9, [1863] Ill. Pvt. Laws 132-38. (6 for the Chicago Reform School); § 1
[1867] Ill. Sess. Laws 38 (8 for the Reform School at Pontiac for the rest of the state).
When the Chicago Reform School closed and Pontiac became a patently penal insti-
tution serving the entire state the age was again raised to ten. See An Act in Regard
to the State Reform School for Juvenile Offenders, § 12, [1873] IMI. Sess. Laws 145-48.
28. E.g., § 4, [1883] IMl. Sess. Laws 169 (under 21).
29. G. WLtAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 16 (2d ed. 1961).
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a judicial scrutiny for incipient criminality, the responsibility concept
did appear. Sometimes this occurred with the interchangeability of in-
sanity and infancy defenses, as might be expected from their common
basis. Thus, in 1883 a Kentucky court held it error to refuse the in-
struction that:
[I]f the defendants broke into the store, as charged, but did so
at the request of another, and in consequence of youth or mental
infirmity, not perceiving the wicked character of the act or not
knowing their responsibility therefor, they should acquit them
of the felony.30
Although comparative statistics proving the point would be diffi-
cult to assemble, it appears from the large capacity of the juvenile
institutions,3' which had assumed the major burden of accomplishing
child-reform, and their periodic overcrowding, that most of the chil-
dren who were brought to court during the nineteenth century were
dealt with as predelinquents for whom responsibility rules were out
of place rather than as criminals to whom such rules might appro-
priately be applied.32 There were, then as now, few juvenile murderers,
arsonists, and rapists. It can be concluded, therefore, that the law re-
lating to responsibility had an insignificant development in the 1800's.
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE JUVENILE COURT ACTs
Infancy
The juvenile court acts, beginning with Illinois in 1899, 3 continued
the nineteenth century concept of predelinquency which was de-
signed to save minors, not to punish them. 4 Accordingly, they made
30. McClure v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. L. Rptr. 448, 451 (1883).
31. In 1853 the New York House of Refuge relocated to Randall's Island in the East
River where 1,000 young deviants could be housed. TWENTY-EIGHm ANNUAL REPORT
oF THE SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUvENILE DELINQUENTs 33, 39 (1853). R.
PicKETI, supra note 1, at 139-41.
32. It is also true that many of the same children who might have been brought to
court were dealt with either by imprisonment in a poorhouse or by being swept up
from city streets and exported to farmers hundreds or thousands of miles away. See
R. THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD 92-140 (1930).
33. (1899] Ill. Sess. Laws 131-37.
34. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 201 (1905).
Speaking of the Illinois Act, Albert C. Barnes, Assistant State's Attorney in Cook
County declared: "Its fundamental idea is that the State must step in and exercise
[Vol. 11:659
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE JUVENILE COURT
no specific mention of responsibility defenses. Unlike the nineteenth
century, however, reported cases appeared in the twentieth century
in which common law irresponsibility challenged the right of the state
to treat children as predelinquents.
The first decision to deal with this conflict contained dictum which
established somewhat peculiar procedures. It arose in Oklahoma in
1912, just three years after that state had enacted a juvenile court law.
Unlike the 1899 Illinois act which contained no such provision, the
Oklahoma law specifically provided that: "Such court might, in its
discretion cause such child to be proceeded against in accordance with
the laws governing the commission of crime." 3 According to Ex parte
Powell
[t]his provision contemplates an investigation by the juvenile
court of the acts complained of, with the view of determining
whether or not the child committed them, and, if so, whether
or not he knew the wrongfulness thereof in a criminal sense. And
should the court find affirmatively, it is then within its discretion
under the law, to hold such child to be proceeded with in the
manner provided by law in a court having competent jurisdiction
of the offense committed, certifying to such court both its find-
ings as to probable cause, and that the child knew the ,wrongfull-
ness thereof.36
The court was combining the infancy defense37 with the original juris-
diction of the juvenile court so as to keep cases where the infancy de-
fense would apply out of the criminal court and in the juvenile court.8
This was an efficient means of preventing criminal prosecutions that
guardianship over a child found under such adverse social or individual conditions
as develop crime. ' Quoted from REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JuvEN-aE CouRTs OF THE
CwcAGO BAR ASSOcIATON 5 (October 28, 1899).
35. The full text of the original Oklahoma juvenile court act is reproduced in Ex
parte Powell, 6 Okla. Crim. 495, 503, 120 P. 1022, 1027 (1912).
The first juvenile court judge in Chicago, Richard S. Tuthill, assumed that even
without explicit statutory authority he could do the same. In his first year on the
juvenile court bench, Judge Tuthill sent 37 children to the grand jury. See the statis-
ieal report in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ILLINOIS CONFERENCE OF CHARITIEs (1900) reported
at SixTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ILLINoIS BOARD OF STATE COMMISSIONERS OF PUB-
LIC CHARITiEs 354 (1900).
36. 6 Okla. Crim. at 506, 120 P. at 1027 (1912).
37. This had become statutory law in Oklahoma. Id. at 505, 120 P. at 1026.
38. The Powell court noted that juvenile court findings that the child knew the
wrongfulness of his act did not relieve the state of proving that point again in a sub-
sequent criminal trial. Id. at 506, 120 P. at 1027.
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were likely to fail. The side effect, however, is that if the child did
not know that his criminal conduct was wrong, he would have no
defense to a charge of delinquency in the juvenile court.
Other cases have been more explicit, but have reached the same re-
sult. In Miller v. State,"9 the Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas held
that the state had to prove criminal responsibility in the juvenile court
just as it would have to prove capacity in a criminal trial against a juve-
nile. The decision is hardly precedent, however, since an earlier Texas
decision had declared juvenile court proceedings to be criminal in na-
ture.40 There was, therefore, nothing unusual in applying the statutory
defense which substantially restated the common law of incapacity.
A similar result was reached under the same juvenile court statutes
twenty years later in Purvis v. State.41 In 1943, however, the Texas
juvenile court law was rewritten to declare the proceedings civil,4
undermining the basis for Miller and Purzis. There is no reported
Texas decision dealing with incapacity in the juvenile court after 1943.
Another case, decided in 1918, arose in Tennessee.43 In State ex rel.
Humphrey, a seven-year-old boy shot and killed his nine-year-old
companion. He was found delinquent in the juvenile court, and re-
manded to the custody of the state. His mother sought and obtained
a writ of habeas corpus in the local court of general criminal juris-
diction on the grounds, inter alia, that the juvenile court judge had
not considered her son's common law incapacity. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee ruled against this contention, although it
upheld the granting of the writ because the juvenile court lacked juris-
diction over homicide offenses. As to the alleged incapacity, the court
said the "age of child is not material in investigation held before the
juvenile court." The opinion reasoned, in true nineteenth century
predelinquency fashion, that juvenile court proceedings are not crim-
inal; their purpose is to provide for the child's welfare; and, finally,
a child is not found guilty of delinquency as though he were being
found guilty of a crime. The Humphrey decision has been cited by
other courts from time to time, but for propositions such as the
benevolent purposes of juvenile courts, but never until 1970 on the ques-
tion of the materiality of common law incapacity. 44
39. 82 Tex. Crim. 495, 200 S.W. 389, 392 (1918).
40. Ex parte McDowell, 76 Tex. Crim. 1, 172 S.W. 213, 214-15 (1914).
41. 133 Tex. Crim. 441, 112 S.W.2d 186 (1938).
42. Tex. Civil Stat. Art. 2338-1 (Vernon 1964).
43. Juvenile Ct. of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201
S.W. 771 (1918).
44. See, e.g., Hills v. Pierce, 113 Ore. 386, 231 P. 652 (1924).
Vol. 11:659666
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When this question arose in federal courts, the same rejection of
the infancy defense occurred. In Borders v. United States,45 the charge
against a twelve-year-old boy was for willfully derailing an inter-
state train. He elected to be proceeded against under the Federal Juve-
nile Court Act 46 and moved for a judgment of acquittal for failure of
the government to prove his criminal capacity. The motion was de-
nied, and the denial was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Judge
Jameson's opinion repeats the litany of the civil nature of delinquency
proceedings, and the good will of everyone concerned in the action.
In discussing incapacity, however, he declared that
[t]he [statute] was enacted with the realization that the youth-
ful offender does not possess maturity of judgment and capacity
to fully comprehend the nature or consequences of his offense.
If criminal capacity must be established in precise conformity
with the rules in criminal cases as a condition of a finding of
delinquency, the process by which this is accomplished will un-
dermine the predicate in realization of which the [statute] was
enacted. 48
This state of the law-unanimous rejection of the infancy defense in
delinquency proceedings by every court that had faced the issue-per-
sisted until January 30, 1970. On that day the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia decided In re Gladys R.4 The appellant was a twelve-year-old
girl who had been found to be a ward of the juvenile court on the
grounds that she had violated the California penal code.5" The Supreme
Count, in banc, and with one dissenting opinion, reversed the finding on
two grounds. The first, with which this article is not concerned, found
error in the fact that the juvenile court judge had reviewed a social
45. 256 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1958). Cf. In. re Smith, 326 P.2d 835 (Olda. 1958).
46. 18 U.S.C. §5031 et seq. (1964). Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994
(S.D. N.Y. 1968) held the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act unconstitutional on the
ground that the juvenile's choice to be proceeded against under it, rather than in a
regular criminal trial, required the waiving of his right to a jury trial.
47. United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1957). The appellate
decision amounts to little more than a statement that the position of the government
and the district court are correct. For this reason the district court opinion is here
cited and discussed.
48. Id. at 216.
49. - Cal. 3rd -, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970).
50. Wardship was found under CAL. WEtF. & INsr'Ns CODE § 602 (West 1966) which
is limited to persons under 21 who violate the criminal law. Gladys was found to have
violated section 647a of the Penal Code which provides penalties for annoying or molest-
ing any child under the age of 18. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 130, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
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study report before a decision had been reached that Gladys had violated
the law.51 Of crucial importance to the problem of responsibility, how-
ever, was the second ground for reversal. For the majority, Tobriner,
J. declared:
A child under the age of 14 must appreciate the wrongfulness of
her conduct in order to become a ward of the juvenile court under
section 602.52
Since there had been no proof that Gladys knew that what she did
was wrong, the wardship could not stand. The rule that the court ap-
plied was found in that part of the Penal Code which enacts the sub-
stance of the common law defense.53 But whereas Humphrey54 and
Borders55 had found implicit in their juvenile court acts an intent to
render inapplicable the common law defense, the Gladys R. majority
read California legislative intent as precisely the opposite. The opinion
rests in this respect on the assertions that "[ilf the Legislature had in-
tended to repeal section 26 or to sever it from section 602, it could
have done so expressly . . ." 10 and that there is a presumption that
statutes are not to be declared repealed by implication. 7 The court
also found that the responsibility standard for children must be different
51. Id. at -, 464 P.2d at 130-32, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 674-76. It was noted, however, that:
The court's review of the social report in advance of the jurisdictional
hearing would perhaps not require reversal in a case in which the contents
of the social study entirely favored the minor and his home environment.
But in the present case the social study showed some inquiry into appellant's
intent under section 647a and some negative indications about appellant's
home environment. Hence, the court's review of the social study prior to
the jurisdictional hearing, at which the jurisdictional facts were far from
conclusive, constituted prejudicial error.
Id. at -, 464 P.2d at 132, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
52. Id.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1955):
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to
the following classes: ... Children under the age of fourteen, in the absence
of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them,
they knew its wrongfulness.
For discussion of problems raised under subdivision five of this statute, exempting
persons who were not "conscious" at the time they committed the act charged see
Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 645
(1963).
54. Supra note 43.
55. Supra note 47.
56. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 133, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
57. Id.
[Vol. 11:659
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from that used for adults, adding that "[a] juvenile court must therefore
consider a child's age, experience, and understanding in determining
whether he would be capable of committing conduct proscribed by
section 602." 58
Apart from these relatively mechanical considerations, the court ex-
pressed a concern for the policy problems involved in making the de-
fense available. In keeping with the current trend of giving increased
attention to the severity or punitiveness which attaches to a juvenile
delinquent status, it was noted that the section 26 defense "pro-
vides the kind of fundamental protection to children charged under
section 602 which this court should not lightly discard." 19 But there
are, of course, consequences in providing the protection of a substantive
defense, namely that the accused child goes free if he succeeds in the
defense. In this regard the court noted that
"[t] he Attorney General expressed some concern that if section 26
prevents a child from being brought under the supervision of the
juvenile court under section 602 'it is quite possible that no other
juvenile proceeding could be initiated other than under section 602.
where the act amounts to something proscribed by the Penal
Code.'" 60
To this the court replied that other jurisdictional provisions of the juve-
nile court law, ones that were less harmful to the child, could be invoked
and "the [juvenile] court might well declare the child a ward under
section 600 or 601." 61
58. Id. at -, 464 P.2d at 134, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 678. These factors have sometimes led
other courts to a similar result via a conclusion that delinquency was not established.
See, e.g., In re Sanders, 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1959) where the court
observed:
There was no previous misconduct of appellant claimed or shown. It was
established at the hearing that appellant had no record of improper conduct
and that his school experience was acceptable and satisfactory both as to
comportment and scholarship. A single violation of a law of the state by a
minor does not always permit of a conclusion that the transgressor is a ju-
venile delinquent.
59. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 134, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
60. Id. at -, 464 P.2d at 136 n.22, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 680 n.22.
61. Id. at -, 464 P.2d at 135, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 679; CAL. WExu. & INST'Ns CODE § 600
(West 1966) provides:
Any person under the age of 21 years who comes within any of the follow-
ing descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and
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Justices Burke and McComb approved of the reversal for the pre-
cipitous use of the social study, but dissented from the application of
the Penal Code § 26(1) infancy defense. Justice Burke's opinion for
the dissenters cited Humphrey and Borders and concluded that even
after Gault 2 " 'the proceedings are nevertheless conducted for the pro-
tection and benefit of the youth in question . ' " 63 and reasoned that,
therefore, the rationale of the earlier case law rejecting the defense was
still valid. Burke also opposed the assumption made in Tobriner's opinion
that the juvenile court would otherwise have jurisdiction over a child
found "not guilty" by virtue of the operation of § 26(1) of the
Penal Code. He opined that in some circumstances a child under
14 might commit a criminal offense without there being the req-
uisite proof that he had knowledge of its wrongness, "and additional
proof to bring the minor within section 600 or 601 might not be avail-
able." 64 As to the majority's footnote citation of a recent California
case declaring the insanity defense available in juvenile court § 602 pro-
ceedings, 65 Burke found that to be distinguishable in that "[p] ermitting
has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise
or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian
actually exercising such care or control.
(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life,
or who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode, or whose
home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity
of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in whose custody
or care he is.
(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or
physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
Id. at § 601 provides:
Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitually refuses
to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents,
guardian, custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the control of
such person, or any person who is a habitual truant from school within the
meaning of any law of this State, or who from any cause is in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the
court.
62. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) holding that juvenile court proceedings must con-
form to Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements, including the right to
counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, adequate notice, and confrontation rights.
63. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 140, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (Burke, J., concurring & dis-
senting) quoting from In re Dennis, M., - Cal. 2d -, 450 P.2d 296, 303, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1,
8 (1969).
64. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 140, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (Burke, J., concurring & dis-
senting).
65. In re M.G.S., 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Ct. App. 1969). The in-
sanity defense can be found in CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(3) (West 1955).
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the defense of insanity . . . does not deprive the minor of needed care
... whereas holding subdivision One of section 26 applicable in such
a proceeding can, as we have seen, deprive minors of needed care." 66
It is important to note what both the majority and the dissenters had
in common. Both were concerned lest a child exculpated by § 26(1)
of the Penal Code simply walk out of the juvenile court scot free. The
court's emphasis on the availability of other jurisdictional basis for pre-
venting this situation evinces as much concern for "needed care" as
does Burke's explicit reference to the problem of § 26(1) insulating
the child from such care. Although neither side mentioned it, surely
the thought must have crossed the minds of the judges that public
safety may also be involved in the decision to free a child who
is unaware that it is wrong to sexually molest another youngster.67
Furthermore, both sides agreed that the central purpose of juvenile
court proceedings was to provide for the welfare of children coming
before the court: the majority saw the major welfare need in terms of
the protection from the harshness of a 602 wardship and its likelihood
of institutional commitment, while the dissenters defined the welfare
need as a matter of insuring some jurisdiction over the child.
It is the crucial question of whether the Penal Code § 26(1) should
be applied to § 602 proceedings that divides the court. The argument
adopted by the majority concerning legislative intent is far from per-
suasive. It is true that the § 26(1) defense was on the books at the time
the juvenile court law was adopted, but why assume that the legislature
intended it to apply in the juvenile court proceedings? As the Hum-
pbrey and Borders decisions prove, there was an equally available ra-
tionale that would render § 26(1) immaterial; the legislature might just
as well have been thinking along the lines later articulated by the courts
that considered the question. Moreover, if there is anything to the sup-
position that legislative supporters of the original juvenile court law
were genuinely concerned with helping children in trouble, then it
makes little sense to attribute to them the simultaneous intent to insulate
these same children from the help by means of a § 26(1) defense. Those
66. - Cal. 3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 141-42, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86 (Burke, J, concurring &
dissenting). As an example of the authority to provide needed care when insanity is
established, Burke cites CAL. WELF. & IIsT'Ns CoDE § 705 (West 1966) which, however,
only deals with temporary commitment for observation and recommendation.
67. A third issue in the case was whether a child may violate CAL. PENAL CODE § 647a
(West 1955) which "applies only to offenders who are motivated by an unnatural or
abnormal sexual interest or intent." The court reached an affirmative conclusion. - Cal.
3rd at -, 464 P.2d at 137, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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legislators would hardly have thought of the helping facilities, such as
reform schools, as being of the same repressive and punititive nature
that the majority of the court seems to assume them to be. It is difficult
to avoid concluding that the matter of legislative intent is little more than
a crutch to support the policy decision the court had arrived at through
other means.
The policy itself does make sense-much more than does that of the
dissenters who would choose to rely on the Humphrey and Borders
position. There are formidable problems of whether and when the al-
ternative jurisdictions (sections 600 and 601) would be available which
the majority does not discuss at all; but for the present, we will con-
cede the assumption that a juvenile court judge may simply choose
whether it will be law violation (§ 602), neglect (§ 600) or some form
of petty juvenile nuisance (§ 601) that will be the basis for the proceed-
ings and judgment. Given the case of a child who has violated the
penal law, but who is so grossly immature (in social and psychological
respects)"' that he fails to recognize that it was wrong to do so, are
there any reasons why he should be dealt with on a basis other than that
of a juvenile delinquent under section 602? Although they were not
mentioned in the opinion of the court, there are various reasons why
the developmentally abnormal juvenile should not be treated as a juvenile
delinquent.
From the inception of a separate system of justice for juveniles in
America, it has been its great shortcoming that the acknowledged help-
lessness of some children in the social and familial conditions in which
they are forced to grow up, has never received adequate recognition in
the law. Invocation of the lack of criminal capacity issue would finally
make relevant the not-his-fault factors in proceedings to determine
whether he is responsible for the harm he has produced.
Dealing with the grossly immature child who commits a crime on
the basis of his immaturity rather than as a consequence of his criminal
behavior presents the opportunity for gaining practical advantages as
well. Once the court has secured jurisdiction over the child, no matter
on what basis, it is standard procedure for the court and the agencies
it is authorized to call upon, to use what resources are available to at-
tempt to help the child-in this case to bring him to a more advanced
stage of moral development and maturity. In this two-step process of
68. The majority noted that: "In the instant case we are confronted with a 12-year-
old girl... [who has] the social and mental age of a 7-year-old." - Cal. 3rd at -, 464
P.2d at 136, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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establishing jurisdiction and embarking on a helping process, there is
value to be gained in consistency. If the child is first condemned as
being and-social and only a bit less depraved than his adult counterpart
convicted of pure crime-a value judgment which seems implicit in a
finding of juvenile delinquency or wardship in California under § 602,
then it is not unlikely that the child will perceive an element of hy-
pocrisy in the offer of help that follows the finding. Probably, he would
tend to see the world as a series of consistencies in which what is offered
as help becomes colored or even dominated by the condemnation he has
just experienced. His cooperation in any disposition plan is, in such
circumstances, going to be less than enthusiastic to the great detriment
of the treatment phase of the juvenile court process. If the proceedings
initially were designed to determine the nature and scope of the im-
maturity and the treatment plan similarly oriented, then this problem
of fostering hypocrisy might greatly diminish.
There is a further practical aspect to the question of which basis of
jurisdiction is appropriate. The fact that the juvenile justice system,
from courts to correctional facilities, has been subjected to a continuous
fiscal starvation is too well known to require either documentation or
extensive discussion. If the system is seen as an organized effort to help
children, then the whole thing seems quite paradoxical. But if it is re-
called that "juvenile delinquent" has traditionally referred to anti-social
children, trespassers on middle-class norms, and junior enemies of the
community, then it is more understandable that the public has been
reluctant to open its purse for the benefit of those who stand poised
against it. What the law has done is to choose from among the charac-
teristics of certain children, not their lack of a decent education (through
no fault of their own), or their location in dilapidated slum housing
(through no fault of their own), or their unattended to health problems
(through no fault of their own), etc., but the instance of conduct in
which they violated the penal law. So long as the legal system thus
isolates and highlights that aspect of the child which rationally calls
for the least sympathy, and ignores the conditions of his life that would
evoke a desire to help, the law simply serves to reinforce the severity
of public attitudes. Were it, however, to shift its emphasis and make
its overriding concern the immaturity of the child and the conditions
that have given rise to it, then at least this process of reinforcement
would lose some of its vigor and perhaps might even be replaced by
legal and public attitudes of understanding and sympathy that could
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lead, in turn, to nourishment instead of starvation of the helping
process.
The Defense of Insanity
Cases in which the insanity defense is raised by a child charged with
crime are rare.69 This is true despite the fact that, in the antebellum
period at least, it was widely believed by American psychiatrists that
insanity was prevalent among the pauper-immigrants in the cities, the
group whose children were prosecuted in the courts. As a well-known
1854 report stated: "Insanity is, then, a part and parcel of poverty;
and wherever that involves any considerable number of persons this
disease is manifested." 70 Perhaps parents were reluctant to suggest
the possibility of their children's insanity in view of the belief that the
affliction was hereditary.71 Alternatively, the reluctance may have been
due to the attachment of a relatively greater social stigma to the in-
sane than to the criminal. Certainly, a factor which largely contributed
to .the paucity of children's cases in which insanity was pleaded must
have been the difficulty of distinguishing this from the incapacity de-
fense. Theoretically, insanity required a mental disease from which
sprang the inability to distinguish right from wrong; the infancy de-
fense had no such requirement. Thus, infancy was easier to establish.
Procedurally, infancy was also more appealing, since the child had
a presumption of incapacity in his favor which required an acquittal
unless affirmatively overcome by the state's proof of his capacity. In
the insanity situation, on the other hand, sanity was asssumed and, if
no one -raised it, the child could legally be convicted. Finally, there
was a difference in outcome that must have exerted a strong influence.
If acquitted by reason of insanity, the child risked being taken to an
insane asylum.72 Success in establishing infancy, however, was an abso-
lute exoneration, and he was free to go home. Not only was there
good reason for children and their parents to avoid pleading insanity,
69. See Donovan, The Juvenile Court and the Mentally Disordered Juvenile, 45
N.D. L. REv. 222, 233-34 (1939).
70. MlASSACH-USETTS COMMISSION ON LUNACY, 1854, REPORT ON INSANITY & IDIOCY IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 45, 52-55 (1855).
71. N. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNrrED STATES, 7-8, 108-13 (1964).
72. Id. Early American Law on commitment of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity is not entirely clear. It seemed to follow as a matter of course in Common-
wealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168 (1810); but in Traux's Case, 1 N.Y. City-Hall Recorder
44 (1816), this sort of acquittal led only to the suggestion by the court that the accused
remain with his friends. In England, commitment was authorized by the Safe Custody
of Persons Charged with Offenses Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94 (1800).
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but, as was noted in regard to infancy, the concept that children
charged with crime were in fact being taken under an official wing
for an underlying disorder of which crime was merely a symptom,
served to de-emphasize, in the eyes of officials, the legal significance
of mental abnormality. This predelinquency orientation was strongly
supported by the view that insanity, like crime and poverty, was based
on a moral derangement which could be educated out of the children.7
There was, therefore, no more reason to exclude them from the "bene-
fits" of this education when they were mentally abnormal and insane,
than when they were developmentally abnormal and immature.
The first juvenile court statutes contained as little codification of
the insanity defense as they did of infancy. Development of court
clinics, staffed by psychiatrists and psychologists,7 4 further isolated the
facts of mental abnormality from the principle of irresponsibility by
reason of insanity. The psychological diagnosis reached by the clinicians
became the primary technique for uncovering the disorder of which
crime was the symptom. When scientific analysis of the child came
fo the aid of the juvenile court judge, it became even more appealing
than it had been in the 1800's to treat the child on the basis of what
he was, rather than for what he had done. To release him for what
he was, mentally abnormal and legally insane, would be to retard the
progress of science. Much of this survives today. A California juve-
nile court judge indicates that [d]ue to [the] non-criminal nature of
the Juvenile Court delinquency proceedings, the [insanity] would
merely be another factor to be considered in determining the treat-
ment needed for the child." 75
The insistance on the noncriminal nature of delinquency proceedings
is a losing battle. With increasing frequency judges are coming to
accept the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
1966:
The philosophy behind the juvenile act is rehabilitation and
treatment, but what may appear to a juvenile worker or judge
as treatment may look like punishment to the juvenile. Irrespec-
73. See N. DAiN, supra note 71, at 111.
74. The founding of the first court clinic is described in Healy & Bronner, The
Work of the Judge Baker Foundation, in HARVEY Hum mryHm BAKER, UPBUILDER OF THE
JuVENLE CoURT 123-31 (-1920).
75. Donovan, supra note 69, at 233. See also In re M.G.S., 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72
Cal. Rptr. 808 (Ct. App. 1969); In re Turner, 56 Misc. 2d 638, 289 N.YS. 2d 652
(Family Ct. 1968).
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tive of what we call the juvenile procedure, and no matter how
benign and well intended the judge who administers the system,
the juvenile procedures, to some degree at least, smack of "crime
and punishment." While the primary statutory goal is the best
interest of the child, that interest is, as it should be, conditioned
by the consideration of "the interest of the public." The interest
of the public is served not only by rehabilitating juveniles when
that is possible, but the interest of the public is also served by
removing some juveniles from environments where they are likely
to harm their fellow citizens. Retribution, in practice, plays a
role in the function of the juvenile court. The judgments of
juvenile courts do serve as deterrents to the conduct of at least
a segment of our juvenile society, not because those juveniles
fear rehabilitation, but because they fear incarceration and punish-
ment. Despite all protestations to the contrary, the adjudication
of delinquency carries with it a social stigma. This court can
take judicial notice that in common parlance "juvenile delin-
quent" is a term of opprobrium and it is not society's accolade
bestowed on the successfully rehabilitated. It is common knowl-
edge also that juvenile records do not, in fact, have a confidential
status. Peace officers' records may be communicated to school
authorities and to other law enforcement agencies. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation has no difficulty in ascertaining whether
an individual has a juvenile record. A juvenile record may be
a substantial handicap to one who seeks employment with the
United States Government. The confidentiality of records, even
if kept inviolate, is no real safeguard to the ex-delinquent for,
if asked whether he was ever so adjudged, he will be morally
obliged to admit it whether or not that status was adjudicated by
due process and fair play. 6
With this view of the juvenile justice system, it is not surprising that
Wisconsin upheld a juvenile court's dismissal of a delinquency petition
on grounds of insanity and approved commitment of the child to a
state hospital.7' The opinion upholding insanity as a defense to a
delinquency charge was also supported by noting that mens rea must
be proved in juvenile court as clearly as in a criminal trial. "It is an
implied premise of every criminal complaint or juvenile petition that
the accused is sane," according to Justice Heffernan, "but when that
premise is challenged by evidence raising a reasonable doubt of the
76. Winburn v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 161-62, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182-83 (1966).
77. Id. at 156, 145 N.W.2d at 179-80.
[Vol. 11:659
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE JUVENILE COURT
defendant's sanity, it becomes the obligation of the state to establish
responsibility." 78 Insanity is not, in Wisconsin, an affirmative defense
which the child must establish, but rather proof that "there was a
failure to form the requisite intent," 79 meaning that only a reasonable
doubt concerning the mens rea need be raised by the evidence of in-
sanity.
While applicability of the insanity defense has been similarly recog-
nized elsewhere,"0 especially in view of the Gault pressure to emulate
criminal proceedings,3' the Winburn position has not gone unchal-
lenged. The New Jersey case of In re H.C. in 1969, expressly refused
to follow Winburn, and held that insanity is not a defense to an ad-
judication of delinquency.s2 The court found that recent developments
in juvenile court law fell short of requiring a finding of "not de-
linquent" when the legal test of insanity was met:
The thrust of recent decisions is toward protection of the
juvenile, in areas where penal sanctions may be imposed, in a
manner similar to the protection afforded adults in criminal
proceedings. The policy basis of those rulings registers concern
that espousal of and reliance on the parens patriae doctrine could,
in individual situations, result in arbitrary action lacking funda-
mental fairness through which the power of the state is brought
to bear upon an individual with the consequence of incarceration-
As I see it, the objective is not to question the philosophy of
juvenile jurisdiction or to hamper the rehabilitative and pro-
tective action of the juvenile court. Rather, it is to insure that
juveniles receive fair treatment and are not handled as second class
citizens, under the guise of social benevolence. Thus, the courts
have sought to insure that a juvenile is afforded certain of the
procedural safeguards inherent in due process and available to
adults, such as counsel, adequate notice and the like. Similarly,
the courts have sought to protect a juvenile from state action
bearing upon the question of whether an offense has been com-
mitted and of whether its detection and proof was fairly ac-
complished without invasion of individual rights. This area in-
78. Id. at 165, 145 N.W.2d at 184.
79. Id.
80. Donovan, supra note 69, at 233 n.33, reports ten instances where the defense
has been "raised"; no data is provided on the success rate.
81. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), holding that a
juvenile court must conduct a hearing to determine probable cause before a child
may be held in pre-trial detention.
82. 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Morris County Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969).
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cludes matters such as entrapment, coerced confessions, search and
seizure, and wire tapping. All of these procedural and sub-
stantive matters properly bear upon the adjudicative phase of
juvenile proceedings.
The "defense" of insanity does not fall within those areas of
constitutional concern over individual rights. It is a special type
of defense which concedes that an act has been committed,
properly detected and properly established. This is certainly the
case here. The accused juvenile, 15 years of age, did perform
the physical acts which resulted in the violent deaths of two
children. Moreover, the propriety of the methods used in de-
tecting and proving these facts are not questioned.
The defense of insanity, then, as applied in adult proceedings,
reflects a social policy that offenders lacking mental capacity
in law to commit a criminal act for which penal consequences-
including death or life imprisonment-could otherwise be im-
posed, should not be held legally, morally or socially account-
able for their acts. The focus is thus not upon the commission
of the act itself but upon the Qenal consequences of it.83
The equal protection objection to ruling out the defense of insanity
was disposed of by viewing the effect of the defense in adult cases as
immunizing insane criminals from the normal penal consequences of
their conduct. These consequences included the fact of conviction
which "brings the deterrent and punitive, as well as the rehabilitative
aspects of criminal process into play." A finding of delinquency, on
the other hand, does not produce penal consequences, for it
triggers the authority of the juvenile court to utilize the powers
it has, consistent with the proclaimed protective and rehabilitative
interests of the tribunal. After adjudication, N.J.S. 2A:4-37,
N.J.S.A. authorizes the use of broad powers to provide for
treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Unlike the
adult criminal courts, the juvenile court may make use of any
public or private facility or institution appropriate and available
under the circumstances. This includes private residential school
placement, public or private mental hospitals, public and private
institutions, and facilities for the training of the mentally retarded
and the emotionally and physically handicapped. If anti-social acts
are committed by children as a result of emotional disturbances,
mental retardation or deficiency, or defect of reason due to
83. 256 A.2d at 326-27.
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mental disease, the court is charged by statute with providing
the proper treatment, rehabilitative measures or therapy.8 4
Two additional points arose- from the In re H.C. rejection of the in-
sanity defense. Concerning the punishment and stigma arising solely
from being adjudged a juvenile delinquent, the New Jersey court
noted that young Winburn had been committed to the state hospital
by the same court that had dismissed the delinquency charge against
him, raising the "question whether Winburn was in reality less stigma-
tized by the label 'insane' which the court placed on him than he
would have been as a juvenile delinquent." 8 5 Finally, the court felt
pressed to avoid accepting a rule of law that would preclude an ad-
judication of delinquency because
[a]bsent adjudication, the court cannot act to exercise its parens
patriae role to aid a juvenile offender. The inquiry, is and must
be "Was the act committed?" To hold insanity applicable as
a defense to adjudication would handcuff the court, run con-
trary to the basic theory of juvenile proceedings, and not be in
the best interests of the juvenile himself.8 6
In spite of the fact that one case accepted the insanity defense and
the other rejected it, the similarities between Winburn and H.C. are
more striling than their differences. In both instances the boys ended
up in the state hospital.8 7 Each court ordered that the boy must be dis-
charged from the hospital without its permission.88 The mental ab-
normalities in each case were recognized as requiring some significant
differentiation of these boys from the typical juvenile delinquent. Each
court was, moreover, faced with the stigma problem in insoluble
terms. The finding of being delinquent or being mentally ill presents
little to choose from, although there is some reason to believe that,
given the option, children would prefer to be know as a delinquent.
The juvenile courts in both states were concerned that the result of a
decision should not be the outright release of an insane child. In de-
84. Id. at 327-28.
85. Id. at 328 n.6.
86. id. at 328.
87. Id.
88. The New Jersey court concluded that: "The juvenile will be adjudicated de-
linquent. Pending review of the probation report and the availability of other proper
facilities, he will be committed to Greystone Park State Hospital for psychiatric treat-
ment!' 256 A.2d at 329. See also 32 Wis. 2d at 165, 145 N.W.2d at 180.
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termining whether the boy was insane, both the New Jersey and Wis-
consin juvenile courts relied on the test used in adult criminal trials
(M'Naughten in both states).
Not surprisingly, these seemingly conflicting insanity decisions evince
concern for the same issues as do the cases dealing with the infancy
defense most recently by the Supreme Court of California. They
also perpetuate an unsatisfactory judicial process for mentally ab-
normal children. If there is anything left of the parens patriae
view, it ought to extend to protecting children from the stigma of
adjudication unless there is some compelling reason to the contary,
such as the need to preserve the deterrent role of juvenile court ad-
judications. In the realm of the mentaly ill or the grossly immature,
what minimal need of that sort that might exist can properly be dis-
pensed with through efforts to avoid handicapping the future healthy
development of children brought to the court.
The insanity cases and the infancy cases continue to share the use
of the right-wrong test. In the former cases, the test is an extremely
inept tool for measuring the mental abnormalities with which the
juvenile court should be concerned. The right-wrong standard does
serve to identify some wrongdoers whose mental condition suggests an
absence of mens rea.89 Reformulations of the insanity standard seek,
moreover, to achieve recognition that there are other offenders whose
mental abnormalities also serve to demonstrate a lack of mens rea, and
who are beyond the influence of legal proscriptions. 0 Were the juve-
nile court concerned only with the mens rea question or with the need
to provide deterrence, then it might be appropriate for it to adopt one
or another of the currently popular tests of criminal insanity. It would
be a relatively simple matter to provide that any child acquitted by
reason of insanity may be committed to a mental hospital. This is
essentially the Wisconsin scheme, applied in Winburn. The major
concern of the court, however, should be the future welfare of the
children before it. This concern is not fully discharged by an out-
come strongly tainted with connotations of behavioral or mental de-
pravity. There is no reason why an effort should not be made to avoid
such an outcome. Juvenile court jurisdiction normally includes look-
89. MODEL PENAL CODE 156 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): "Absent these minimal
elements of rationality, condemnation and punishment are obviously both unjust and
futile."
90. "The draft accepts the view that any effort to exclude the non-deterrables from
strictly penal sanctions must take account of the impairment of volitional capacity no
less than impairment of cognition." Id. at 157.
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ing after the welfare of neglected children who are emotionally ill,91
and could easily extend to those mentally deranged children who com-
mit delinquent acts. It would be bound neither to commit, release nor
order any other predetermined disposition, but could, free of deter-
rence and condemnation considerations, do its best to provide for
the individual needs of the child. If therapy is called for, that process
stands to benefit by an effort to divest the offer of help from the
accusatory, punitive, and stigmatizing elements in the Winiurn and
H.C. alternatives. Where the elements of parental fault involved in a
neglect proceeding are not present, the court should be authorized to
vest the case in public or private child-care agencies, just as it would
in cases initially brought to it on a non-delinquency basis. Placing the
child under care and protection authority also raises the possibility
that more can be done for one presented as an emotionally disturbed
child, than for a person characterized as a mentally ill delinquent. But,
if there is some potential to be exploited in helping children in a com-
plex of troubles, then it makes little sense to limit that effort to instances
where the emotional problems relate directly to the presence of mens
rea and deterrence. These elements from criminal jurisprudence are
present, but are of secondary importance in the juvenile court.92 What
is at stake is the nature of society's interest in mentally abnormal chil-
dren who commit delinquent acts, and the question of whether in ap-
propriate cases the delinquency can be ignored, not by the predicate
of an insanity acquittal, but truly be ignored and stricken from the
child's record is most significant to the future development of the
child, The juvenile court ought to be given broad discretion to quash
the delinquency petition, substituting a care and protection petition
when there is evidence of mental abnormality. This solution recog-
nizes that while public welfare is sometimes in conflict with the child's
interests, the recognition of a broad, exculpating concept of irresponsi-
bility, proposed here, seeks to focus on the fact that normally, such com-
munity interests are minimal. There is no a priori reason why, out of the
many problems a child may be experiencing, society must always select
a delinquent act as the basis for its action toward him. It is also true-
91. See, e.g., N.Y. FAImY CT. ACT § 312 (McKinney 1963).
92. THE PEsmENr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
JusTiCE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967):
The juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other agencies of
criminal justice with protecting the community against threatening con-
duct.. . . What should distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts
is greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not exclusive preoccupation with it.
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that there may be cases where severe mental illness may accompany
such an aggressive and dangerous defiance of other people's rights
that care and protection jurisdiction might not provide adequate pub-
lic security. The juvenile court might lack authority to order the de-
gree of physical restraint or long-term treatment that would be called
for. In such a situation a resort to civil commitment proceedings would
appear to be the best solution. 93
THE RESPONSIBLE AND THE IRRESPONSIBLE CHILD
The proposal thus far advanced is that proof of the commission of
delinquent acts ought not to dictate that a child be treated as a de-
linquent in all cases. The act may be part of immaturity or mental ab-
normality, rather than delinquency, which ought to command the at-
tention of the court. There already has been some recognition of a
need for this sort of flexibility. The Model Rules for Juvenile Courts,
for example, provides that a petition may be amended by the court
"at any time before an adjudication." 94 The comment to this rule
suggests that "[t]he power to amend the petition can also be used
in appropriate cases to convert a delinquency petition to a neglect
petition; such amendments avoid giving the child a record of de-
linquency." 9 The New York Family Court Act contains similar au-
thority, although phrased in terms of "substitution" rather than amend-
ment. Section 716 provides:
(a) On its own motion and at any time in the proceedings the
court may substitute a neglect petition . . . for a petition
to determine whether a person is in need of supervision.
(b) On its own motion and at any time in the proceedings, the
court may substitute a neglect petition . . . for a petition
93. This was the result required by the D.C. Court of Appeals in response to the
issue, as put by Bazelon, C. J.: "In particular we must determine what obligations
juvenile authorities, acting as parens patriae, have with respect to mentally disturbed
adolescents." Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Burger,
J. dissented on the ground that the decision of the juvenile court to waive the
psychotic Kent to a criminal trial was a matter for its discretion. 401 F.2d at 412, 415.
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 35 (1968) requires resort to civil commitment
when evidence of mental illness appears at a dispositional hearing, strongly implying
thereby that the court is to go ahead and reach a delinquency finding regardless of
the appearance of such evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. It is this branding of
mentally ill children as delinquents that this paper proposes is unnecessary and wrong.
94. MODEL RutLs FOR JUVENILE Couars rule 8 (1969).
95. Id. rule 8, Comment.
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to determine delinquency or for a petition to determine
whether a person is in need of supervision.9 6
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act of 1968 provides no authority to
amend or substitute so as to convert the proceedings from delinquency
to something else.97 Even the provisions of the New York law and
the recommended rules are defective, however, in that they provide
absolutely no policy guides as to when, and for what purpose, the
amendment or substitution is to be made. While it is beyond the scope
of this article to deal with all the possible circumstances that might
support a petition change, the intent here is to urge that when re-
sponsibility is absent, the change is in order, and that the two common
law conceptions of responsibility be broadened so as to maximize the
opportunities for flexibility.
What is needed is a relatively simple statute authorizing a "waiver
down" to another sort of petition or referral to another agency.
Needed also is a rule that when evidence relating to immaturity or
mental condition is introduced, the burden passes to the state to show
that it is the delinquent act, not the other conditions, which ought
to govern the choice of jurisdiction or the referral options under which
the court is to proceed, and to show that no change should be made
regarding the delinquency petition. Promotion of individualized justice
for children, as important as that might be, is not the sole reason for
requiring a juvenile court to use its discretion in determining this ques-
tion. It is also a matter of seeking to prevent the juvenile court from
becoming just one more tribunal at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy
where minor crimes are charged and justice is dispensed on an as-
semblyline basis. There is more risk of this degeneration now than
ever before. The President's Crime Commission has made major rec-
ommendations concerning how cases might be kept out of the adjudi-
catory phases of the juvenile court, and out of court entirely. The
proposals for Youth Service Bureaus and consent decree procedures"
reflect a judgment that, upon entering the portals of the juvenile court
96. N.Y. FAMILY CouRr AcT § 716 (McKinney 1963).
97. The Act does, however, relate to a class of children called "deprived," defined
as being "without ... care.. . necessary for his . . . mental, or emotional health, ..
and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of his parents."
UNIFoRM JuvrENuE CourT Acr § 2(5) (i). The Act also, impliedly, rules out insanity
as a defense, since § 35 provides for an examination and possible civil commitment, only
at a disposition hearing, 6r a waiver hearing. .Strangely, there is no comment to § 35.
98. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTIcE,
THE CHAL.ENGE OF CRIUM IN A Fana Socwinn 83, 84 (1967).
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hearing room, the best advice is "abandon hope all ye who enter here."
Cognate recommendations for greater use of procedural formalities"9
further serve to create an image of the juvenile court as a child-devour-
ing dragon against whom every weapon from the legal armory needs
to be invoked. There are still likely to be large numbers of children
coming before the court, and the reforms relating to pre-court screen-
ing should not divert attention from the need to continue screening
out cases where punitive consequences are inappropriate, even when
the cases have gone as far as a hearing on the merits. Legislation is
needed to insure that the inherently punitive features of the juvenile
court are not overused in the court."'°
99. Id. at 85-87.
100. The means by which petitions are changed or substituted need to be con-
structed with an awareness that the process may border on violation of double jeopardy
limits. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Tolliver v. Judges of Family
Court, 59 Misc.'2d 104, 298 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1969). If petitions'are not substituted
or amended but jurisdiction is found on a basis not alleged, it must be borne in mind
that the Supreme Court of the United States has already held that: "It is as much
a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge
on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was
never made." Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). In brief, the drafting prob-
lems involved in providing for the "waiver down" are substantial. In re Gladys R.
did not consider the questions of double jeopardy or variance. The most relevant
part of the California juvenile court law, CAL. WELr. & INST'NS CODE § 678 (West
1966), merely says that the rules governing variance and amendments of pleadings in
civil actions shall apply.
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